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Case No. 870009 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A FIRST-
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION* OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
302 (1953 AS AMENDED), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
LEONARD H. RUSSON, PRESIDING. 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery, a 
first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(h) (1953 as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the state properly exercised its rights under 
Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). 
a* Whether defendant properly invoked Article III of the 
IAD thus precluding the state from exercising its 
Article IV rights. 
b. Whether defendant's official notice of the detainer 
lodged against him on May 14, 1986 is violative of 
Article III(c) of the IAD, and would in any event 
warrant a dismissal of the charges. 
2. Whether Article III of the IAD properly invoked, 
requires the 180 day period to be computed from the 
date defendant was made available for trial in Utah. 
3. Whether defendant's state and federal constitutional 
rights to a speedy trial were violated. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
1. Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
2. Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(f) (1953 as amended). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1953 as amended). 
(The above provisions are set forth in addendum K.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Terry Martin, was charged in Salt Lake County 
with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, and 
one count of aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony (R. 13-
14). 
Defendant moved to dismiss the charges alleging a violation 
of his rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers § 77-
29-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) [hereinafter IAD] cind the 
Constitution of the State of Utah and the United States 
Constitution, occasioned by the state's alleged failure to abide 
the terms of the IAD. (R. 16) . 
Defendant's motion for dismissal was heard on December 3, 
1986. Memoranda of Points and Authorities were filed by both 
parties. The motion was denied on December 5, 1986 (R. 21-25). 
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Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and the case was 
submitted to the court on a written stipulation of facts and the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing without argument (R. 44) • 
Defendant was found guilty of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, as charged in count one. Count two (aggravated 
kidnapping) was dismissed on the State's motion (R. 49). 
Defendant was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison to commence after being released from the federal prison 
system (R. 51). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent facts in the present appeal were stipulated to 
in a pre-trial hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss the 
charges held December 3, 1986. The stipulation allowed for two 
defense and seven state exhibits to be received into evidence (R. 
79). (The exhibits are reproduced in the addendum.) Additional 
aspects of the stipulation are discussed as they become relevant. 
On November 19, 1985, while being detained by federal 
authorities awaiting trial on federal charges in New Mexico 
defendant requested the use of the institution's law library to 
"look up case history and affidavits of extradition from 
California, Washington, and Utah." (addendum J, R. 74). The 
request was denied because defendant had assigned counsel 
(presumably on the pending federal charges) (addendum J, R. 74). 
On January 17, 1986, defendant was sentenced on the federal 
charges in New Mexico (R. 73). 
In a letter dated February 21, 1986, Peter Schoenburg, an 
Assistant Federal Public Defender, sent a letter to Richard 
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Shepherd, Assistant [County] Attorney for Salt Lake County, 
stating that defendant was currently incarcerated in the 
Bernlello County (New Mexico) Detention Center, but might be 
transferred to a United States prison for continued service of 
his sentence (addendum A) . The letter also requested "final 
disposition . . . of any indictment, information or complaint or 
other charge pending" against the defendant. The request, 
although mentioning the IAD, did not otherwise attempt to comply 
with any procedures necessary to invoke the IAD. 
A letter dated March 13, 1986, was sent to Mr. Shepherd by 
the United States Marshall's service indicating that the 
defendant had been transferred to the United States Prison in 
Lompoc, California to serve his federal sentence (addendum B) . 
The letter also indicated that the Salt Lake County warrant was 
forwarded to Lompoc. 
On April 11, 1986, Mr. Shepherd made a formal request for 
temporary custody of defendant under the provisions of Article 
IV of the IAD (addendum C) . The request was accompanied by 
Agreement on Detainers Form V (addendum D) , thus complying with 
the appropriate procedures under the Article IV of the IAD. The 
letter was returned marked "moved" with the notation "transferred 
court" (see addendum C). Investigation revealed that the 
defendant had been temporarily transferred to Sacramento for 
action by the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of California for action relating to a probation 
violation (addendum E). 
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On May 14, 1986, defendant was formally notified by Lompoc 
Prison officials that they were aware of the Salt Lake County 
charges pending against him (thus lodging the charges as a 
detainer for purposes of the IAD) (addendum I) . They also 
notified him of his rights under the IAD to request disposition 
of the charges (addendum I). A letter dated May 14, 1986, 
(termed a "Detainer Action Letter") was sent to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office indicating that the federal institution 
in Lompoc had officially notified the defendant, Terry Dale 
Martin, that the Salt Lake County charges had been filed as a 
detainer against Mr. Martin. The letter further indicated that 
the defendant was currently on a federal writ and that upon his 
return "we will continue the IAD process." (addendum E). 
Stipulation of counsel acknowledged that the defendant, if 
called, would testify that he was not advised by the custodial 
officials of the detainer prior to May 14, 1986 (R. 79-80). 
Defendant, when notified of the detainer, purportedly indicated a 
desire to invoke Article III of the IAD.1 
A letter dated May 29, 1986 was received by the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office from Carl A. Larson, Chief Assistant 
Federal Defender for the Eastern District of California in 
Sacramento (addendum F) . The letter indicated that defendant's 
probation had been revoked and the defendant had been sentenced 
1
 Defense counsel argues this assertion as fact, however, 
the assertion is merely based on an inference drawn from the 
handwriting on the top left corner of the notice of detainer 
reading, "wants to file on these." (addendum H) . The record 
does not reveal who made the notation or indicate any of the 
attendant circumstances which led to the notation being made 
(See, R. 83-84). 
5 
in the United States Court for the Eastern District of 
Californiaf a copy of the judgment dated May 28, 1986 was 
attached. That same letter also requested a speedy trial on the 
Utah charges or alternatively that the Utah charges be dismissed 
(because of the length of the federal sentence). 
Defendant was returned-to Lompoc on June 4, 1986 (R. 73). 
On June 18, 1986, Mr. Shepherd sent a letter addressed to 
the legal clerk at the United States Prison at Lompoc, requesting 
the current status of Salt Lake County's request (under Article 
IV of the IAD) for temporary custody (addendum G) . The letter 
indicated a willingness to take custody as soon as possible in 
view of defendant's request for a speedy trial. A copy of the 
letter was also sent to the defendant. 
On August 22, 1986, Mr. Shepherd received a letter from the 
administrative systems manager at Lompoc along with the 
necessary forms for temporary custody under Article IV of the IAD 
(addendum H) . The letter indicated that defendant had been 
advised of Utah's request for custody on May 14, 1986 and that 
pursuant to Article IV, 30 days must elapse, before the 
institution could make the defendant available for temporary 
custody. The thirty days would expire on June 15, 1986. The 
form to deliver temporary custody was signed by the defendant. 
No explanation was offered for the delay in sending the forms to 
Salt Lake County. 
Counsel stipulated that the defendant was booked in the Salt 
Lake County Jail on October 24, 1986 (R. 79). Defendant was 
tried on the Utah charges 53 days later on December 16, 1986. 
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On November 24, 1986 defendant moved to dismiss the charges 
alleging that his rights under the IAD had been violated (R. 16). 
The motion was heard in the pre-trial hearing on December 3, 1986 
(R. 72) . Points and Authorities were submitted by both counsel 
(R. 26-42)• After hearing argument, the court found thatf (1) 
"the state properly exercised its rights under Article IV of the 
Act on disposition of detainers against prisoners [IAD] in April 
of 1986f . . ." (R. 23) • (2) "[T]he defendant made no proper 
invocation under the provisions of Article III [of the IAD] 
prior to May 14, 1986" (R. 24). And (3) "that in any case, the 
180 day period of Article III would not commence until the 
defendant was returned to the state [sic] prison at Lompoc after 
sentencing in Sacramento, and finally made available for trial in 
Utah." (R. 24). The court based its findings on the same 
stipulated facts and evidence presented to this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The present appeal centers around a determination respecting 
which party properly invoked the terms of the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Defendant claims to have invoked 
Article III of the IAD based on two letters written by counsel 
and/or a notation reading "wants to file on these" marked on the 
corner of defendant's notice of detainer dated May 14, 1986 (see, 
addendum A, F and I). Defendant does not claim that Utah failed 
to follow proper procedures necessary to invoke Article IV of the 
IAD, only that it was precluded from invoking Article IV by 
defendant's having first invoked Article III. 
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Article III outlines specific procedures a defendant must 
follow in order to invoke the terms of the IAD. Notably, the 
defendant must notify the prosecuting officer and the appropriate 
court in the prosecutor's jurisdiction. A written notice and 
request for final disposition given to the proper custodial 
officials will be forwarded by the custodial officials to the 
appropriate officers. 
Defendant's letters from which he claims to have invoked 
Article III are addressed to the prosecutor alone. By the 
language of the statute, letters addressed only to the prosecutor 
are not sufficient to invoke the terms of Article III. Williams 
v. Maryland, 445 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1978); Grey v. Benson, 443 
F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (D. Kan. 1978); State v. Smith, 669 P.2d 368 
(Or. App. 1983). 
Defendant's additional claim that he gave appropriate notice 
to prison officials evidenced by a notation reading, "wants to 
file on these" on his notice of detainer fails for two reasons. 
First, defendant did not receive the notice of detainer until May 
14, 1986, in April of 1986 Utah had already properly invoked the 
provisions of Article IV, thus precluding defendant from a later 
invocation of the IAD in May of 1986. Secondly, the notation is 
by itself is insufficient to establish that defendant filed a 
written request for final disposition. At best the notation 
raises an inference that defendant may have given notice to his 
case manager of an intention to invoke Article III of the IAD in 
the future. 
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Defendant's argument that Utah charges should be dismissed 
because he did not receive prompt notification of the detainer 
must fail because the record neither establishes, nor does 
defense counsel suggest, when the detainer was filed. 
Furthermore, dismissal of charges based on an alleged violation 
of the prompt notice requirement found in Article III(c) does not 
warrant a dismissal of the charges. 
Even if this Court finds that defendant invoked Article III, 
the 180 day period to bring defendant to trial must be computed 
from the time defendant was made available for trial in Utah. 
Article VI of the IAD provides that the running of time periods 
"shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is 
unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having 
jurisdiction of the matter." Accord, Young v. Mabrv, 596 F.2d 
339, 342 (8th cir. 1979). The defendant was not made available 
for trial earlier than receipt of a letter dated August 22, 186, 
therefore, Utah brought the defendant to trial well within the 
180 day provision. 
Defendant's rights to a speedy trial under both the United 
States and Utah Constitutions were not violated. The purpose of 
a speedy trial right is to guard against any intentional delay 
which may be oppressive or prosecutorial in nature. U.S. v. 
Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966). 
Concerns behind speedy trial provisions do not appear to be 
present in the instant case. There was no pretrial incarceration 
stemming from the Utah charges. Defendant was already 
incarcerated on federal charges in New Mexico, sentenced and 
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serving time in Lompoc. Under such circumstances, the concerns 
for loss of liberty, disruption of employment, strain on 
financial resources and exposure to public obloquy are clearly 
non-existent. Defendant who was subject to federal jurisdiction 
in the District of New Mexico and the Eastern District of 
California (addendum A and F) and state jurisdiction in Utah and 
possibly Washington now seeks to use his own misconduct as a 
basis to avoid legitimate criminal charges. 
Assuming the purposes behind the speedy trial provisions 
were present in this case, the facts of each case should be 
reviewed. Accordingly, the standard of review establish by 
Barker v. Wincro, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), which examines the (i) 
length of delay, (ii) reasons for the delay, (iii) defendant's 
efforts to assert his right, and (iv) prejudice to the defendant, 
clearly indicates that the defendant did not suffer a violation 
of his federal or state constitutional right to a speedy trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 
IV OF INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS (IAD). 
Utah's adoption of the Interstate Agreements on Detainers 
(IAD), is codified in Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended). 
The primary purpose of the IAD is to provide a mechanism for 
prisoners to insist upon speedy and final disposition of untried 
charges that are the subjects of detainers so that prison 
rehabilitation programs initiated for the prisoner's benefit will 
not be disrupted or precluded by the existence of untried 
charges. People v. Hicrinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1986) 
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(citations omitted). Accord, Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 448-
49 (1981); Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 Article I (1953 as amended). 
Both the state and the defendant have specified responsibilities 
under the IAD to fulfill this purpose. 
The state where untried charges are pending is entitled 
under Article IV to acquire temporary custody of a prisoner 
against whom it has lodged a detainer. Under Article IVf trial 
proceedings must be commenced "within 120 days of the arrival of 
the prisoner in the receiving state." 
The prisoner's right to request disposition of any untried 
charges is outlined in Article III. Article III provides that 
whenever during a term of imprisonment there is pending in 
another state an untried Information on which a detainer has been 
lodged, he must be brought to trial with 180 days after he has 
caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the 
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction 
written notice of the place of his imprisonment and request for 
final disposition. The written notice and request must be sent 
by the prisoner to the official having custody of him, who shall 
forward it to the prosecuting official and court by registered 
mail. 
The present case calls for consideration of which party 
properly invoked the procedures of the IAD. Defendant contends 
that two letters written by counsel and/or a notation reading 
"wants to file on these" marked on the corner of defendant's 
notice of detainer dated May 14, 1986, (see, addendum A, F, and 
I) invoked Article III of the IAD. 
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Defendant does not contend that the State of Utah failed to 
follow the proper procedures necessary to invoke Article IV, only 
that it was precluded from invoking Article IV by defendant's 
having first invoked Article III. Resolution of the present 
appeal, therefore, first requires a determination of whether the 
defendant sufficiently complied with the procedures necessary to 
invoke Article III. If this Court determines that the defendant 
failed to properly invoke Article III, or otherwise qualify for 
Article III protection, there is no dispute that the State fully 
complied with the provisions of Article IV and that the defendant 
was properly convicted under the provisions of the IAD. 
A. The Defendant Did Not Properly Invoke Article III 
Provisions Of The IAD. 
Article III of the IAD details specific procedures which are 
incumbent on a defendant wishing to avail himself of the 
statutory rights conferred under the IAD. 
Article III(a) provides: 
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of 
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a 
party state, and whenever during the continuance of the 
term of imprisonment there is a pending in any other 
party state any untried indictment, information or 
complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been 
lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to 
trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be 
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate 
court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written 
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his recruest 
for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, 
information or complaint; . . . . The request of the 
prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the 
appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, 
stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner 
is being held, the time already served, the time 
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of 
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the 
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prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency 
relating to the prisoner. 
(Emphasis added). Article 111(b) further states: 
The written notice and request for final disposition 
referred to in paragraph fa) hereof shall be given or 
sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of 
corrections or other official having custody of him, who 
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate 
to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by 
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. 
(Emphasis added). Defendant's claim that he invoked the above 
provisions by two letters addressed directly to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office bears no resemblance to the requirements 
set forth in the statutory language and cannot be construed to 
have properly invoked the Article III provisions of the IAD.2 In 
Williams v. Maryland, 445 F. Supp. 1216 (D.Md. 1978) , the court 
considered whether a defendant alleging violation of rights 
under the IAD had complied with the requisite notice 
requirements. The court stated, 
[M]ore is required than merely addressing a request to 
one of the persons required by the statute to be 
notified. . . . The notice provision of the IAD was 
obviously enacted to ensure adequate notification to the 
state, and its particulars may not be ignored totally. . 
. . A prisoner seeking to benefit from the statutory 
provisions must first meet the burden of compliance with 
the Act. 
Id. at 1220. 
Generally it is acknowledged that in order for a prisoner 
"to comply with Article III a charged prisoner's only 
2
 Defendant's other claim that the notation reading "wants 
to file on these" marked on the notice of detainer dated May 14, 
1986 (see, addendum I) invoked Article III, even if sufficient to 
invoke Article III, occurred after the State had formally 
requested temporary custody under Article IV on April 11, 1986 
(see, addendum C and D). This claim is discussed infra. 
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responsibility is to file a request for final disposition with 
the official having custody of him." State v. Carroll. 670 P.2d 
1290, 1292 (Haw. App. 1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
It is, however, the prisoner's burden to prove that he filed such 
a request with the appropriate official. Id. at 1292-93. 
In the present case, neither of the two letters claiming to 
invoke Article III were addressed to or were otherwise brought to 
the attention of the federal custodial officials. Rather they 
were sent directly to the prosecutor and him alone. Thus under 
Carroll, defendant's correspondence with the prosecutor alone is 
clearly inadequate to successfully invoke Article III. 
In Grey v. Benson. 443 F.Supp. 1284, 1286 (D. Kan. 1978), 
the court ruled that a prisoner's letter to the prosecuting 
attorney alone, requesting a disposition of detainers was 
insufficient to trigger Article III. Similarly in State v. 
Smith, 669 P.2d 368 (Or. App. 1983), the court held that notice 
and request for final disposition under Article III must be sent 
by the prisoner to his custodian, not the prosecutor. Id. at 
370. In Smith, defendant's attempts to initiate speedy trial 
proceedings by directly contacting the prosecutor were 
ineffective to start the running of the 180 day period of Article 
III. As a result the court rejected defendant's argument that he 
was entitled to dismissal of the charges based on the that claim 
that he substantially complied with the statute by sending 
requests to the district attorney. Id. at 370. 
Defendant in the present case, should likewise be denied 
dismissal of the charges based on the claim that two letters 
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addressed solely to the Salt Lake County Attorney requesting a 
speedy trial were sufficient to invoke Article III of the IAD. 
Defendant's argument that the letters substantially complied 
with the requirements of Article III is without merit. 
Defendant's failure to notify correctional officials is clearly 
not in compliance with the plain language of Article Ill's notice 
requirement. 
The notation on the notice of detainer indicating "wants to 
file on these" (addendum I) arguably might be construed as a 
request to custodial authorities for a final disposition of 
charges; however, two critical problems prevent such an 
interpretation. 
First, the State had already officially requested temporary 
custody invoking Article IV of the IAD in April of 1986 (R. 23, 
addendum C) . The defendant was thus precluded from invoking 
Article III later in May of 1986 (see, addendum I). 
Secondly, it is doubtful that the defendant could carry the 
burden of proof that he "file[d] a request for final disposition 
with the official having custody of him." Carroll 670 P.2d 1292-
93. A bare notation reading, "wants to file on these", marked on 
the notice of detainer (addendum I) without further explanation 
does not establish that the defendant "filed a request" with 
appropriate prison officials. At best, the notation raises an 
inference that the defendant expressed to his case manager an 
intention to invoke Article III in the future. Furthermore, even 
if defendant orally notified his case manager, there is no 
showing that he "filed" a request with the official having 
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custody of him. The language of Article 111(b) expressly 
provides that "written notice and request for final disposition" 
must be sent to the appropriate custodial officials* There is no 
showing of a "written notice" or a "filed request" in the present 
case and the record is notably void of any additional facts to 
support such a claim. Therefore, defendant's argument that he 
invoked Article III, based on the notation "wants to file on 
these" marked on the notice of detainer must fail. 
Accordingly the trial court's finding that the State 
properly exercised its rights under Article IV in April of 1986, 
and that the defendant made no proper invocation under the 
provisions of Article III prior to May 14, 1986, should be 
sustained. See. State v. Kourbelas. 621 P.2d 1238, 124 0 (Utah 
1980) (Proper deference must be given to rulings of trial court); 
Seibold v. Turner. 20 Utah 2d 165, 435 P.2d 289 (1967) (Supreme 
Court duty to sustain trial court's ruling based on competent 
evidence). 
B. Defendant's Official Notice Of The Detainer Lodged 
Against Him On May 14, 1976 Is Not Violative Of Article 
III(c), And Would Not In Any Event Warrant A Dismissal 
Of The Charges. 
Defendant argues that in addition to invoking Article III, 
because he did not receive an official notice of detainer until 
May 14, 1986, two months after being transferred from New Mexico 
to Lompoc, the charges against him should be dismissed. 
Defendant's claim is based on the language of Article III(c) 
which states: 
The warden, commissioner of corrections or other 
official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly 
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inform him of the source and contents of any detainer 
lodged against him and shall also inform him of his 
right to make a request for final disposition of the 
indictment, information or complaint on which the 
detainer in based. 
1. Defendant has not established when a detainer was 
lodged against him. 
The record does not establish nor does defendant assert when 
a detainer was filed against the defendant. Nevertheless, 
defense counsel relying on Romans v. District Court, 633 P.2d 477 
(Colo. 1981), asserts that Lompoc officials were dilatory in 
notifying the defendant of the detainer lodged against him and 
that as a result Utah charges against the defendant should be 
dismissed. (Br. App. at 7-8). Without establishing when a 
detainer was lodged against him, defendant's claim must be 
considered unfounded and without merit. 
In Romans a detainer was lodged against the defendant on May 
29, 1980, but defendant did not receive official notice until 
October 24, 1980. Romans 633 P.2d at 479. The court determined 
that as a result of the delay3 coupled with the failure of the 
custodial officials to inform the defendant of his rights to 
invoke Article III of the IAD, the charges against him should be 
dismissed.4 Id. at 481. 
3
 The court held that the defendant did not enter a term of 
imprisonment until August 29, 1980. Thus the delay was computed 
from August 29, rather than May 29, 1980. 
4
 The court in a later decision, People v. Hiainbotham. 712 
P.2d 993, 1001 (Colo. 1986), ruled that failure to promptly 
inform defendant of a detainer lodged against him and his right 
to request final disposition of the charge did not warrant 
automatic dismissal; rather, a hearing was ordered to determine 
whether the defendant was prejudiced before ordering a dismissal. 
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Defendant in the present case, does not suggest that there 
was a delay by custodial officials in informing the defendant of 
the detainer. Rather, defendant argues that the delay from 
being transferred to Lompoc on March 12, 1986, until the time he 
received notice of the detainer on May 14, 1986, represents 
grounds for a dismissal of the charges. (Br. App. at 7-8). 
Admittedly, a Utah warrant was included in the paper work 
forwarded to Lompoc in March 1986 as a part of defendants file, 
(addendum B) . However, defendant never intimates that Lompoc 
prison officials were aware of outstanding charges or that they 
were treating the Utah charges a detainer which would interfere 
with defendant's rehabilitation programming5 before it provided 
notice to the defendant on May 14, 1986. Defendant's argument 
that charges against the him should be dismissed because he was 
not given notice of a detainer against him for sixty-three days 
after arriving in Lompoc, without showing or even intimating that 
custodial officials delayed in notifying him of the detainer, is 
not only unsupported by the language of Article III(c) but 
without judicial precedent. 
2. Even if defendant did not receive prompt notice of 
the detainer lodged against him, lack of prompt 
notice under article III(c) does not justify a 
dismissal of the charges. 
Under the IAD, dismissal of the charge in the receiving 
state is authorized in only three instances: (1) if, after a 
5
 Article I states the primary purpose of the IAD is to 
eliminate "uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner 
treatment and rehabilitation." Accord, People v. Hicrinbotham, 
712 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1986) (citations omitted); Cuvler v. 
Adams. 449 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1981). 
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prisoner has made the required request pursuant to Article III, 
trial does not occur with the required 180 days—Article V(c) ; 
(2) when trial does not occur before the prisoner, having been 
transferred to the receiving state, is returned to the sending 
state—Article IV(e); and (3) when the receiving state fails or 
refuses to accept temporary custody of the prisoner—Article 
V(c). 
In State v. Barefield, 735 P.2d 1339 (Wash. App. 1987), the 
court noted that cases involving a violation of the prompt notice 
provisions of Article III(c) produced split decisions. See e.g., 
cases not dismissing charges, Coit v. State. 440 So. 409 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (IAD prompt notice provisions directory; 
violation thereof does not result in dismissal of charges); State 
v. Clark. 222 Kan. 65, 563 P.2d 1028 (1977) (IAD prompt notice 
provision directory only because IAD has no sanction for failure 
to comply) ; Commonwealth v. Gonce. 320 Pa. Super. Ct. 19, 466 
A. 2d 1039 (1983) (dismissal allowed only under explicit 
provisions of the IAD). Cases noted dismissing charges included 
People v. Lincoln. 42 Colo. App. 512, 601 P.2d 641 (1979) 
(compliance with notice provisions is mandatory), and People v. 
Office. 126 Mich. App. 597, 337 N.W.2d 592 (1983) (failure to 
bring formal charges against defendant violates good faith and 
the spirit of the IAD). The court in Barefield. where the 
defendant did not receive notice of the detainer against him for 
over one year, concluded: 
Having considered the foregoing cases, we conclude that 
Congress intended sanctions to be applied only where 
they are expressly allowed under the IAD. To conclude 
otherwise would result in ad hoc determinations by 
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individual member states determining whether officials 
had acted "promptly". It is for Congress, not the 
courts, to set time limits for giving notice and for 
forwarding materials. We, therefore, hold that 
dismissal under the IAD is not mandated in this case. 
Barefield 735 P.2d at 1346. 
The logic of the Barefield court is especially persuasive in 
view of Article IX1 s directive that "[t]his agreement shall be 
liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes." Article I 
states the primary purpose of the IAD is to eliminate 
"uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and 
rehabilitation." Accord, People v. Hicrinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 
997 (Colo. 1986) (citations omitted); Cuyler v. Adams. 449 U.S. 
433, 448-49 (1981). Furthermore, "courts have generally held 
that prisoners must strictly comply with IAD procedures before 
they will dismiss charges on the basis of a violation of Article 
III." Nash v. Jeffes. 739 F.2d 878, 884 (3rd cir. 1984) rev'd 
473 U.S. 716 (reversed on other grounds); See, Williams v. 
Maryland, 445 F.Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.Md. 1978) ; Gray v. Benson, 
443 F.Supp. 1284, 1286 (D.Kan. 1978); People v. Primmer, 59 
A.D.2d 221, 222, 399 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (1977), afffd. 46 N.Y.2d 
1048, 389 N.E.2d 1070, 416 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1979); State v. 
Brockinaton, 89 N.J.Super. 423, 430, 215 A.2d 362, 365-66 (1965). 
The evidence in the present case indicates that defendant not 
only failed to strictly comply with the IAD procedures, but has 
even failed to invoke its terms. It would be contrary to the 
purposes of the act, sound statutory construction, and the weight 
of authority to provide the defendant with a windfall 
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opportunity to avoid legitimate criminal charges pending in this 
or any other jurisdiction. 
II. EVEN IF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE III WERE PROPERLY 
INVOKED, THE 180 DAY PERIOD MUST BE COMPUTED FROM THE 
DATE DEFENDANT WAS MADE AVAILABLE FOR TRIAL IN UTAH. 
The trial court's finding that the 180 day period of Article 
III would not commence until the defendant was returned to prison 
in Lompoc after sentencing in Sacramento, and finally made 
available for trial in Utah is supported by the language of 
Article VI of the IAD as well as case law. 
There are two prerequisites before Article III of the IAD 
may be invoked; (i) the defendant must be serving a term of 
imprisonment, and (ii) a detainer must be filed. Defendant was 
sentenced on federal charges on January 17, 1986f but a 
detainer apparently was not lodged anytime prior to May 14, 
19866. Consequently, defendant technically could not invoke 
Article III any time prior to May 14, 1986. 
Article VI of the IAD provides that the running of time 
periods "shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner 
is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having 
jurisdiction of the matter." Accord. Young v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 
339, 342 (8th cir. 1979). When Utah requested temporary custody 
under Article IV from Lompoc on April 11, 1986 (addendum C) the 
state was informed that the defendant was unavailable because he 
was on a federal writ, but that the IAD process would be 
6
 Neither the record or defense counsel indicate a detainer 
was filed prior to May 14, 1986. See discussion under 1(B)(1), 
p. 17-18. 
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continued when Lompoc reacquired custody (addendum E) . On June 
18, 1986, Utah requested information regarding the status of 
their request for temporary custody under Article IV (ciddendum 
G) . The response to that request was a letter dated August 22, 
1986 informing Utah that it could finally assume temporary 
custody of the defendant (addendum H). Accordingly, the 180 day 
period of Article III must be computed from the time defendant 
was made available for trial in Utah, which time began no 
earlier than upon receipt of the letter dated August 22, 1986, 
(addendum H) . Defendant was booked into the Salt Lake County 
Jail on October 24, 1986 (R. 79), and brought to trial on 
December 16, 1986, well within the 180 day provision of Article 
III. 
III. DEFENDANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO 
A SPEEDY TRIAL WERE NOT VIOLATED. 
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution, Amendment VI; Utah Constitution, Article I, 
§ 12. See also, Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(f) (1953 as amended). 
The right is: 
. . . not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the 
defense caused by passage of time; that interest is 
protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by 
statutes of limitations. The speedy trial guarantee is 
designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy 
incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but 
nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed 
on an accused while on bail, and to shorten the 
disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of 
unresolved criminal charges. 
United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982). The focus is on 
the impairment or "restraint on personal liberty, disruption of 
employment, strain on financial resources, and exposure to public 
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obloquy. . . . " Id. at 9. See also. United States v. Marion. 
404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). Similarly, in State v. Weddle. 29 Utah 
2d 145, 506 P.2d 67, 68 (1973), this Court noted that: 
The right to a speedy trial assured by our Constitutions 
refers, of course, not to the speed at which a trial 
proceeds, but rather to the right of an accused to be 
brought to trial without undue delay. This is a right of 
ancient origin which arose because of abuses wherein 
people were kept in custody for unreasonable periods of 
time without trial and even without knowing any abuse of 
that character. But in the absence thereof, it should 
not be extended as a mere abstraction of law in 
circumstances where there is no justification for its 
application. The statement itself is general and there 
is no particular length of time which can be specified as 
a standard in all instances in order to avoid 
infringement of the right. The correct application of 
the principle depends upon the facts of each case. The 
total picture should be looked at to see whether there 
has been any such abuse of imposition upon the accused as 
the provision was designed to protect against, so that he 
was prejudiced in having a fair trial and just treatment 
under the law. 
In State v. Archuletta. 577 P.2d 547, 548 (Utah 1977), this Court 
stated: 
The purpose of those constitutional provisions is to 
guard against any intentional delay which may be 
oppressive or prosecutorial in nature. U.S. v. Ewell, 
383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed. 627 (1966). 
The concerns behind speedy trial provisions are not present 
in the instant case. There was no pretrial incarceration 
stemming from the Utah charges. Defendant was already 
incarcerated on federal charges in New Mexico, sentenced and 
serving time in Lompoc. Under such circumstances, the concerns 
for loss of liberty, disruption of employment, strain on 
financial resources and exposure to public obloquy are clearly 
non-existent. Moreover, the record indicates defendant was aware 
of Utah charges as early as November 19, 1986 (addendum J). 
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Defendant who was subject to federal jurisdiction in the 
District of New Mexico and the Eastern District of California 
(addendum A and F) and state jurisdiction in Utah and possibly 
Washington now seeks to use his own misconduct as a basis to 
avoid legitimate criminal charges. 
Assuming the purposes behind the speedy trial provisions 
were present in this casef the facts of each case should be 
reviewed. The United States Supreme Court has noted that whether 
the federal speedy trial right has been violated is determined by 
balancing the " . . . length of delay, the reason for the delay, 
the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 
defendant. Barker v. Winqo. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Similar 
considerations also apply under the Utah Constitution. State v. 
Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Utah 1984); State v. Knill. 656 P.2d 
1026, 1029 (Utah 1982); State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 
(Utah 1982); State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1979); State 
v. Giles. 576 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1978). This Court elaborated 
on the above factors in Weddle as follows: 
In making that determination, where there has been what 
may appear to be undue delay, it is important to 
consider whether or not there was justification for it 
including: (1) which party caused it; (2) whether it 
may have been wilful and/or for some improper purpose; 
(3) whether the defendant was aware of his rights; (4) 
whether he made known his desire for a speedy trial; (5) 
whether by words or conduct there was explicit or 
implicit waiver; and (6) whether the proceeding was 
completed as soon as reasonably could be done in the 
circumstances. 
Weddle 506 P.2d at 68. Application of these factors demonstrates 
no violation of defendant's speedy trial rights. 
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1. LENGTH OF DELAY 
Defendant in the present case was booked into Salt Lake 
County Jail on October 24, 1986 (R. 79) and brought to trial 53 
days later on December 16, 1986. Defendant makes no argument 
that 53 days represents a violation of his speedy trial rights. 
Defendant, argues however, that the delay should be computed 
from November 19, 1986, when defendant requested use of the law 
library while in federal prison on other charges (Br. App. at 21, 
addendum J). Defendant's assertion why the delay should be 
measured from this date rather than when defendant was in Utah's 
custody is unsupported by any legal analysis and fails to reflect 
an understanding of the purposes underlying speedy trial rights. 
In any event, should this Court accept defendant's argument, the 
purported delay in this case, is relatively short, not more than 
13 months. (Br. App. at 21). 
The Supreme Court in Barker indicated there is no precise 
point at which the delay becomes prejudicial per se. Rather, the 
inquiry must be determined on an ad hoc basis considering the 
circumstances in each case. Id. 530-31. In Barker, the delay 
between arrest and trial was over five years, and the conviction 
was still upheld. The same result should be reached in the case. 
2. REASONS FOR DELAY 
Delays in the present case, if they in fact exist, are 
solely attributable to prior illegal acts of the defendant which 
caused several jurisdictions to compete for his custody, all 
wanting to bring the defendant to trial. In Barker, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
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Closely related to length of delay is the reason 
the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, 
different weights should be assigned to different 
reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in 
order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily 
against the government. A more neutral reason such as 
negligence or overcrowded prisons should be weighed less 
heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the 
ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest 
with the government rather than with the defendant. 
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, 
should serve to justify appropriate delay. 
Barker 407 U.S. at 531 (Footnote omitted, emphasis added). 
Defendant's unavailability to stand trial in Utah because of a 
foreign jurisdiction's custody must be considered a valid reason 
which justifies appropriate delay. 
In State v. Archuletta. 577 P.2d 547, 548-49 (Utah 1977), 
referring to the right of speedy trial, this Court stated: 
The purpose of those constitutional provisions is 
to guard against any intentional delay which may be 
oppressive or prosecutorial in nature. . . . [T]he 
court does not lose jurisdiction . . . unless there is 
some intentional delay of an oppressive character, which 
results in prejudice to the defendant[.] 
The rule is firmly established that any delay attributable 
to the defendant should not be considered in determining whether 
his right to a speedy trial was denied. See, State v. Weddle. 
506 P.2d at 68; State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d at 116; State v. 
Kellv, 123 Ariz. 24, 597 P.2d 177, 179 (1979); and Cherniwchan v. 
State. 594 P.2d 464, 468 (Wyo. 1979). 
Defendant committed several illegal acts which resulted in 
competition between several jurisdictions to bring the defendant 
to trial or to revoke his probation. While in the federal 
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custody defendant was beyond the jurisdiction of Utah which 
effectively precluded Utah from commencing its prosecution.7 
The record does not contain any facts which would indicate 
that the State engaged in any actions which were intentionally 
oppressive, dilatory, willful, or for an improper purpose, or 
even negligent. Moreover, the delay was largely attributable to 
acts of the defendant. 
3. DEFENDANT'S EFFORTS TO ASSERT HIS RIGHT 
Defendant may assert that he attempted to assert his right 
to a speedy Utah trial through letters dated February 21, 1986 
and May 29, 1986. However, defendant's attempt to assert his 
rights occurred while he was incarcerated in foreign 
jurisdictions and unavailable for custody in Utah. When Utah 
gained temporary custody on October 24, 1986, defendant's right 
to a speedy trial was properly honored, defendant being brought 
to trial in 53 days. 
Again it is important to recognize that any delay, which 
could arguably amount to a violation of defendant's right to a 
speedy trial, resulted from defendant's own misconduct which led 
foreign jurisdictions to compete for defendant's custody. This 
Court has recognized that a defendant may implicitly or 
explicitly waive his right to a speedy trial. Weddle, 506 P.2d 
at 68. Despite defendant's written requests for a speedy trial, 
this court may properly hold that, defendant, through his conduct, 
See related discussion under Point II, p. 21-22. 
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either explicitly or implicitly waived his right to a speedy 
trial. 
4. PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT 
In Barker, the Supreme Court pointed out that the right to a 
speedy trial is different from other constitutional rights in 
that the deprivation of that right may in fact work to the 
defendant's advantage. 
Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time 
between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, 
witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may 
fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case 
will be weakened, sometimes seriously so. And it is the 
prosecution which carries the burden of proof. Thus, 
unlike the right to counsel or the right to be free from 
compelled self-incrimination, deprivation of the right to 
speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused's 
ability to defend himself. 
Barker 407 U.S. at 521-22. 
Evaluation of the prejudice suffered by the defendant should 
be assessed in light of the interests which the speedy trial 
right was designed to protect. As was shown earlier, those 
interests are not present in the instant case. The concern for 
oppressive pretrial incarceration clearly does not apply in 
defendant's case. 
Furthermore, defendant does not cite even one instance of 
prejudice experienced during his trial on the Utah charges. 
Defendant's only claim of prejudice is a weak unsubstantiated 
inference that his rehabilitation process may have been 
interfered with, contrary to the purpose of the IAD. This 
claim, however, finds absolutely no support from the record. 
Lompoc prison officials apparently did not consider the detainer 
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lodged against the defendant until May 14, 1986. When Utah 
requested temporary custody from Lompoc in April 1986, Lompoc 
replied that defendant was away on a federal writ (addendum E) 
and therefore not within their custody. Obviously, when 
defendant was not in the custody of the only custodial officials 
aware of the detainer lodged against him, his rehabilitation 
programming could not be interfered with. Defendant was returned 
to Lompoc on June 4, 1986, (R. 73) and thereafter released to 
Utah custody in October 1986 (R. 79) . Clearly any interference 
with defendant's rehabilitation programming would be minimal at 
best during the period of June to October 1986. More 
importantly, defendant does not attempt to articulate any 
instance of prejudice or example of rehabilitation interference. 
This Court has repeatedly refused to reverse convictions 
where the defendant has failed to establish any specific or real 
prejudice. See e.g. . State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d at 1193 (no 
prejudice where both defendants were granted pretrial release); 
State v. Knill, 656 P.2d at 1029 (defendant "makes no persuasive 
allegation of prejudice for delay"); State v. Menzies. 601 P.2d 
925, 926 (Utah 1979) ("period which elapsed before trial neither 
inconvenienced nor prejudiced defendant"). In the present case, 
defendant fails to make any persuasive allegations of prejudice, 
therefore, any prejudice suffered by the defendant is speculative 
at best. 
Consideration of the analysis under the four prong test of 
Barker indicates that defendant has not suffered a violation of 
his federal or state constitutional right to a speedy trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction. 
Dated this 2-* day of March, 1988 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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TOVA INDRITZ 
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER 
February 21, 1986 
Mr. Richard Shepherd 
Assistant District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: TERRY DALE MARTIN 
Dear Mr. Shepherd: 
Please be aware that Terry Dale Martin is currently incarcerated 
at the Bernalillo County Detention Center in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico pursuant to a seven year sentence imposed by U.S. District 
Court Judge Juan Burciaga in the District of New Mexico in 
Criminal No. 85-219. He is hereby requesting final disposition 
by your office of any indictment, information or complaint or 
other charge pending against Mr. Martin in your jurisdiction. 
The Bernalillo County Detention Center's address is P.O. Box 
1293, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103. The phone number there is 
(505) 842-8008. 
Mr. Martin may, in the near future, be transferred to a United 
States Prison for continued service of his seven year sentence. 
Should that happen, his location can be determined by contacting 
the Unites States Marshallfs Office in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
phone number (505) 766-2933. It is my client's specific interest 
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, his state 
constitutional right to a speedy trial and due process and his 
federal constitutional right to speedy trial and due process to 
have the charges pending in your office disposed of as soon as 
possible by trial or otherwise. 
Please contact me, his counsel in federal district court here in 
New Mexico, if you need any aditional information regarding Mr. 
Martin's demand for speedy trial. 
( Sin^er^ly, 
Piter Schoenburg j 
Assistant Federal Public Defender 
PS/lh-1 
TELEPHONE 
( 5 0 5 ) 7 6 6 - 3 2 9 3 
FTS 4 7 4 - 3 2 9 3 
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ADDENDUM B 
U.S. Department of Justice 
United States Marshals Service 
District of New Mexico 
12403 United States Courthouse and Federal Building 
500 Gold Avenue, Southwest 
Post Office Box 444 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103 
March 13, 1986 
Richard S. Shepherd 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: MARTIN, Terry D. 
Reg. No.: 02960-051 
Dear Mr. Shepherd: 
Your warrant on above subject was forwarded along with our 
paperwork to USP Lompoc where Terry Martin will serve his sentence. 
You will need to write to the records office to assure your warrant 
is outstanding. Write to the following address: 
United States Penitentiary 
Attn: Records 
3901 Klein Blvd. 
Lompoc, California 93436 
Sincerely, 
D. R. BACA 
United States Marshal 
DRB/cj 
j§>alt THake (Hmutty JVttnrnc^ 
231 East 400 South 
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ADDENDUM C 
<§ti\CB of % ^ait T&nkt (Sountg ^ttovnzy 
T.L. "TED" CANNON 
County Attorney 
MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ 
Chiof Deputy County Attorney 
April 11, 1986 
Warden 
United States Penitentiary 
3901 Klein Boulevard 
Lompoe, California 93436 
Re: Terry Dale Martin 
Reg. No. 02960-051 
Dear Warden: 
I am making inquiry regarding Terry Dale Martin, whom I 
understand is currently housed in your institution. We have a 
local charge pending against said prisoner and wish to begin 
proceedings on the Interstate Agreement of Detainers. 
I am enclosing herewith Agreement on Detainers Form V 
requesting temporary custody in order that you may begin the 
appropriate procedures under the Detainers Act. 
Would you please verify that the above individual 
institution and inform me of the terms of said 
confinement. Thank you for your assistance. 
is in your 
prisoner1s 
RICHARD S. SHEPHERD 
Deputy County Attorney 
kc/0173T 
pc: Terry Dale Martin 
Irving Marks 
231 East 4th South Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 363-7900 
O County Attorney Victim Services C3 Justice Division O Investigative Agency D Civil Division D Governmental Servia 
ADDENDUM D 
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS FORM V 
Five copies. Signed copies must be sent to the prisoner and 
should be sent to the Agreement Administrator of the state which 
has the prisoner incarcerated. Copies should be retained by the 
person filing the request and the judge who signs the request. 
REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY CUSTODY 
TO: WARDEN, UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY 
3901 Klein Boulevard, Lompoc, California 93436 
Please be advised that Terry Dale Martin, who is presently an 
inmate of your institution, is under Information in the County of 
Salt Lake, of which I am a Deputy County Attorney. Said inmate 
is therein charged with the offense(s) enumerated below: 
OFFENSE 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony 
Aggravated Kidnapping, a first degree felony 
I propose to bring this person to trial on this Information 
within the time specified in Article IV(c) of the agreement. In 
order that proceedings in this matter may be properly had, I 
hereby request temporary custody of such person pursuant to 
Article IV(a) of the Agreement on Detainer^") 
Signed: /^Cw^£^ 
RfCHARD S. 
Title: Deputy County Attorney 
I hereby certify that the person whose signature appears above is 
an appropriate officer within the meaning of Article IV(a) and 
that the facts recited in the request for temporary custody are 
Agreement on Detainers Form V 
Page 2 
correct and that having duly recorded said request, I hereby 
transmit it for action in accordance with the terms and the 
provisions of the Agreement on Detainers. 




U. S. Department of Justice 
Bureau of Prisons 
JO- Office of the Salt Lake County Attjj. 
231 E. 4th South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Institution 
USP, Lompoc, CA 
Date 
May 14, 1986 
DN LETTER 
1 Inmate's Name 
MARTIN, Terry Dale 
Your 





The below checked paragraph relates to the above named inmate: 
• This office is in receipt of the following report regarding the above named: 
. Will you please investigate this report and advise 
what disposition, if any, has been made of the case. If subject is wanted by your department and you wish 
a detainer placed, it will be necessary for you to forward a certified copy of your warrant to us. 
A detainer has been filed against this subject in your favor charging Aggravated Robbery and 
Aggravated Kidnapping 
. Release is tentatively scheduled for 
however we will again notify you approximately 60 days prior to actual release. 
06-18-1990 via2/3rds 
Q Enclosed is your detainer warrant Your detainer against the above named has been removed in compli-
ance with your request 
• Your letter dated requests notification prior to the release of the above named 
prisoner. Our records have been noted. Tentative release date at this time is 
Q I am returning your 
to serve 
on the above named inmate who was committed to this institution on 
for the offense of . 
If you wish your filed as a detainer, please return it to us with a cover letter stating your 
desire to have it placed as a hold or indicate you have no further interest in the subject 
Q The above named inmate has been transferred to 
Your detainer/notification request has been forwarded. 
(3 Other: Currently this inmate i s on a Federal Writ. Upon his return, we wi l l 
continue IAD process. 
jrgal Clerk 
for Adrfrfnistrative Systems Manager or 
Chief Record Officer 
Record Form eY 
April , iS7 t 
Original White-Addn 
Pint Copy (Green) • Judgment & Commitment File 
Second Copy (Canary) • Inmete 
Third Copy (Pink). Centre! File (Section 1) 
Fourth Copy (OoWenrod) • Correctional Services Department 
UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY—^ 
3901 Klein Blvd. 
Lompoc, CA 93436 
lJt »v\ 
Official Business 
Penalty for Private Use, $300 
. AL'JAi 
AGE Ahfa FEE8 PAID 
DEPARTMf NCT CQF JUSTICE r\ 
JU84 
VL 
ATTN: Richard S. 'Shepherd, Deputy County Attorney 
Office of the Salt Lake 
231 E. 4th South 




OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL DEFENDER 
EASTERN D I S T R I C T O F C A L I F O R N I A 
1 128 FIREHOUSE ALLEY 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 9 5 8 1 4 
E. R I C H A R D WALKER <FTS> * 6 ° - i ° 6 7 
FEDERAL DEFENDER <9I6> " I * 1 0 6 7 
May 29, 1986 
Mr. Dick Shepard, Esq. 
281 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111 
281 East 400 south COUNTY ATTORNEY 
JUSTICE DIVISION 
Re: U.S. v. Terry Dale Martin 
Cr.S 85-167 EAR 
Dear Mr. Shepard: 
Mr. Martin received a five (5) year sentence 
in the Eastern District of California to run con-
secutively to the seven (7) year sentence that he 
is now serving. His total sentence is twelve (12) 
years. 
On behalf of Mr. Martin, I would like to 
reassert his demand for speedy trial on the 
charges pending in Utah. In light of his lengthy 
federal sentence, I would also request that the 
charges pending in your jurisdiction be dismissed. 
If you have any questions on this matter, 
please feel free to contact me. With best wishes, 
I remain, 
Respectfully yours, 
CARL A. LARSON 
Chief Asst. Federal Defender 
CEL:dls 
Enclosure 
* f e ^ TERRT DALE KARTIfl 
EASTERN DISTRICT »F (\*LiFuRKiA 
CP. i.-i*5-167 
DOCKET NO. 
JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER AO 245 (9/S2) 
"\ In the presence of the attorney for the government 








I WITHOUT COUNSEL However the court advised defendant of right to counsel and asked whether defendant desired to hav 
counsel appointed by the court and the defendant thereupon waived assistance of counsel. sel a i te  y the c rt a  
Can Larson, Esq. I 1 W I T H COUNSEL I 
GUILTY, and the court being satisfied that 
there is a factual basis for the plea, 
(Name of Counsel) 
I I NOLO CONTENDERE, I NOT GUILTY 
HN0M61 
iffct of < o 
f NOT GUILTY. Defendant is discharged 
There being a finding/vVf& t < 
GUILTY. 
Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offense(s) of V i o l a *»V- o f T i t l e <•'•. USC o £ o 1 ( r j ; -
^Pcssoss^en of Uf reqisicred Firvarr! as efcarced ir. ' r !nri*rtrv»rt <* tK* Kort^er* 
3istr<ct of California, ^^ e defendant f*avtr$ auoittci violirij; i of allegation 
#5 of the petition, the Court hereby revokes probation zn? passes sentence as 
follows: 
The court asked whether defendant had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced. Because no sufficient cause to the contrar 
was shown, or appeared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that; The defendant i 
hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney Ceneral or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of r IV E \ j) 
YEARS pursuant to 4 ^ ( a ) , tne defendant is to receive credit for t1«e served. 
*IT IS OKDLHED TiIAT tne sentence is to run consecutively* one after the other* with 






MAY a t 
MtMSWSsL 
M addition to the special conditions of probation imposed above, it b hereby ordered that the general conditions of probation seTouVorTtht 
reverse side of this iudgment be imposed. The Court may change the conditions of probation, reduce or extend the period of probation, anc 
at any tame during the probation period or within a maximum probation period of five years permitted by iaw, may issue a warrant anc 
revoke probation for a violation occurring during the probation period. 
MTM 
The court orders commitment to the custody of the Attorney General and recommends, It Is ordered that the Clem deliver 
a certified copy of (nW Judgment 
and commitments© the#U.S. Mar* 
shal or other qu^fieaoffiter. 
N t o i t 
Li-* 
CERTIFIED AS ATRUE CORDON 
< V M~eV THIS DATE 
^ * ^ *
 w > t ' e 
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL DEFENDER 
EASTERN DISTRICT OP CALIFORNIA 
1125 FIREHOUSE ALLEY 
SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 9 5 8 1 4 
OFFICIAL SU0INKSS 
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Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM G 
A. J. Battles, Legal Clerk 
United States Penitentiary 
3901 Klein Boulevard 
Lompoc, California 93436 
Re: Inmate Terry Dale Martin 
Reg. No. 02960-051 
Dear A. J. Battles: 
I received your detainer action letter of May 14, 1986, 
regarding the above-named inmate. I was subsequently notified by 
the office of the Federal Defender that he was sentenced in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
California on May 28, 1986. Could you advise me as to the 
current status of our request for custody under the Interstate 
Act on Detainers. 
Mr. Martin has had counsel indicate his demand for a speedy 
trial and we are ready to take custody for the purpose as soon as 
he is available. 
RICHARD S. SHEPHERD ' 
Deputy County Attorney 
kc/0304T 
cc: Terry Dale Martin 
231 East 4th South Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 363-7900 
tmtton O County Attorney Victim Services B Justice Division a Investigative Agency D Civil Division D Governmental Services 
ADDENDUM H 
U. S. Department of Justice 
Federal Prison System 
U. S. Penitentiary 
T.L. Cannon 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
231 E. 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: MARTIN, Terry D. 
Reg#: 02960-051 
DOB: 11-04-52 
3901 Kkin Blvd. 
Lompoc, CA 93436 
Auqust 22. 1986 
Dear Mr. Cannon: 
Pursuant to your request for temporary custody of Mr. Martin under Article IV 
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, enclosed are forms BP-DIR-93 and 94. 
Article IV provides "that there shall be a period of thirty days after receipt 
by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored." You request was 
received by this office during May, 1986. Mr. Martin was advised of your 
request on May 14, 1986. Therefore Mr. Martin will be available to be taken 
into state custody on or after June 15, 1986, unless you are notified to the 
contrary. Before we can transfer Mr. Martin to your custody, we must receive 
the Agreement on Detainers Form VI (Evidence of Agent's Authority to Act for 
Receiving State). 
Final arrangements for pickup may be made by contacting our Administrative 
Systems Department at 805-735-2771. Please have your agents contact them 48 
hours prior to pickup. 
Be assured of our continued cooperation in matters of mutual interest. 
Sincerely, 
JL/\ Peggy Kinman 
*^ Administrative Syst ems Manager 
cc: Clerk of the Court 
Compact Administrator 




BUREAU OF PRISONS 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 
In the case of an inmate's request for disposition under Article III, copies of this Form should 
be attached to all copies of Form 2. In the case of a request initiated by a prosecutor under 
Article IV, copy of this Form should be sent to the prosecutor upon receipt by the warden of 
Form 5. Copies also should be sent to all other prosecutors in the same state who have lodged 
detainers against the inmate. A copy may be given to the inmate. 
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS 
CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS 
R E : „_MARTIN, Terry 02960-051 JI?pjL_LoxnPoci Lc?!}P0Jil. c^l 
(Inmate) (Number) (Institution) (Location) 
The (custodial authority) hereby certifies: 
1. The term of commitment under which the prisoner above named is being held: 7 y e a r s 
4205(a) 
2. The time already served: Date s e n t e n c e d 01 -17 -76 7-months +90 days J .C, 
J a i l C r e d i t : 10 -19-85 t o 01 -18 -86 = 90 days 
3. Time remaining to be served on the sentence: 2251 days 
4. The amount of good time earned: 56 days 
5. The date of parole eligibility of the prisoner: 02 -16 -88 
6. The decisions of the Board of Parole relating to the prisoner: (if additional space is 
needed use reverse side) N / A 
7. Maximum expiration date under present sentence: 1 0 - 1 8 - 9 2 
8. Detainers currently on file against this inmate from your state are as follows: 
Agg. Robbery/Agg. Kidnapping 
DATED: .^?^.A2 .I .A9 .Ll 






: _ Peggy Kinman^ Admin._ System Mgr, 
LP-DIR-94 
2-71 
BUREAU OF PRISONS 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 
In the case of an inmate's request for disposition under Article III, copies of this Form should 
be attached to all copies of Form 2. In the case of a request initiated by a prosecutor this Form 
should be completed after the Warden has indicated his approval of the request for tempo-
rary custody or after the expiration of the 30 day period. Copies of this Form should then be 
sent to all officials who previously received copies of Form 3. One copy also should be given to 
the prisoner and one copy should be retained by the warden. Copies mailed to the prosecutor 
should be sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested. 
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS 
OFFER TO DELIVER TEMPORARY CUSTODY 
Date „Mgust.2j2.L„1.986. 
,nn Mr. T.L. Cannon ^ .. - _ . 
TO: Prosecuting Officer 





And to all other prosecuting officers and courts of jurisdictions listed below from which indict-
ments, informations or complaints are pending. 
RE: mRTTTV.-Tarry — Number Q2M0rJ3.51.CLl 
(Inmate) 
Dear Sir: 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article V of the Agreement on Detainers between this state 
and your state, the undersigned hereby offers to deliver temporary custody of the above-named 
prisoner to the appropriate authority in your state in order that speedy and efficient prosecu-
tion may be had of the indictment, information or complaint which is (described in the attached 
inmate's request) (described in your request for custody of Jl^Xl^B£- ). 
(Date) 
(The required Certificate of Inmate Status is enclosed.) (ff*«*aq*i«ied^ito*ic^ 
(Date) 
If proceedings under Article IV (d) of the Agreement are indicated, an explanation is attached. 
Indictments, informations or complaints charging the following offenses also are pending 
against the inmate in your state and you are hereby authorized to transfer the inmate to custody 
of appropriate authorities in these jurisdictions for purposes of disposing of these indictments, in-
formations or complaints. 
Offense County or Other Jurisdiction 
Agg. Robbery County, S a l t Lake C i t y 
& g g . y iSnapping County f Salt Lake City 
Offense (cont'd) County or Other Jurisdiction (cont'd) 
If you do not intend to bring the inmate to trial, will you please inform us as soon as possible? 
Kindly acknowledge. 
(Name and Titl£~of Custodial Authority) 
JU*gY: Peggy Kinman, Admin. System Mgr. 
..U^E^.ioi3^QC^.35ill-JCLein.BJLYd>--LQmpoc 
(Institution and Address) 9 3 4 3 6 
My counsel is 
(Name of Counsel)! 
whose address is ._ . R&„Skf&--£PA---$£l)iU(^J^-T&^J7tb3 
(Street, City, and Staty) -^ ' 
- - ---1^0$y_2U_Z-ZZ33-- £n^...Y.2Hr.Ji?.fJ.. 
B. I request the court to appoint counsel.
 y 





BUREAU OF PRISONS 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 
In duplicate. One copy of this form, signed by the prisoner and the warden should be re-
tained by the warden. One copy, signed by the Warden, should be retained by the prisoner. 
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS 
NOTICE OF UNTRIED INDICTMENT, INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT 
AND OF RIGHT TO REQUEST DISPOSITION 
Inmate . - ] ^ I ™ l . l 5 5 J 7 . i L ^ ? No. ^ ^ i P ^ / f ^ n s t . ^??I-^??iLc.1L™ 
Pursuant to the Agreement on Detainers, you are hereby informed that the following are the 
untried indictments, informations, or complaints against you concerning which the undersigned 
has knowledge, and the source and contests of each.
 c 
Taking a Motor Vehicle without Permission ^ f * - ? ^ * * * ' " < * ^ l»4#~ 
Robbery in the F i r s t Degree *»«- ^ 
Kidnapping in the F i r s t Degree ^ f 
/te&, aeaa.
 f j££ K;,#H/>',-*/* / jrifer **(<£- c!ry/ ur+4. 
You are hereby further advised that by the provisions of said Agreement you have the right to 
request the appropriate prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction in which any such indictment, infor-
mation or complaint is pending and the appropriate court that a final disposition be made thereof. 
You shall then be brought to trial within 180 days, unless extended pursuant to provisions of the 
Agreement, after you have caused to be delivered to said prosecuting officer and said court writ-
ten notice of the place of your imprisonment and your said request, together with a certificate of 
the custodial authority as more fully set forth in said Agreement. However, the court having ju-
risdication of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
Your request for final disposition will operate as a request for final disposition of all untried 
indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against 
you from the state to whose prosecuting official your request for final disposition is specifically di-
rected. Your request will also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or 
proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein and a waiver of extradition to the state of 
trial to serve any sentence there imposed upon you, after completion of your term of imprison-
ment in this state. Your request will also constitute a consent by you to the production of your body 
in any court where your presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of the Agree-
ment on Detainers and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the institution in which you 
are now confined. 
Should you desire such a request for final disposition of any untried indictment, information 
or complaint, you are to notify _„JL°ur_CaseLl!ajia&er
 0f the institution in which 
you are confined* 
You are also advised that under provisions of said Agreement the prosecuting officer of a ju-
risdiction in which any such indictment, information or complaint is pending may institute proceed-
ings to obtain a final disposition thereof. In such event, you may oppose the request that you be 
delivered to such prosecuting officer or court. You may request the Warden to disapprove any such 
request for your temporary custody but you cannot oppose delivery on the grounds that the Warden 
has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
DATED: .J?*..1.* 1.1?!*-
Edwin Meese, I I I , U.S. Attorney General 
(Insert Name and Title of Custodial Authority) 
g y . Peggy A. Kinman 
Administrative Systems Manager 
RECEIVED 
DATE 
INMATE , NO. 
MARTIN, Terry Dale 
02960-051 
FW LC 1-74 7IC T N I 
ADDENDUM J 
I 
IS 67 (3-84) revised 
LAW LIBRARY 
CDM 
I am requesting to be allowed to use the Law Library: 
F R O M / ^ l / / ^ 7l££V DATE/VbO J?,/?**" /LOCATION S~S U * 2-z. 
PRINT NAME 
ERENCE: 
CASE NUMBER__2o2l2_l_3 COURT JURISDICTION: D Civil Federal 
NOTE CHECK BLOCK PERTAINING TO CASE: U Civil District 
To i.,t *P MS, H,<rTc*v J/xnd*>iJs ,f etTUJiT** * C r i m i n a l Fede ra l 
ncc o„ n is ., T- u U Criminal District 
^ U Other/Explain 
ASSIGNED OR ASSISTING ATTORNEY i??7h S c H o e . U ^ ^ ATTORNEY PHONE *?66 3 ^ 7 3 
flAXM U 
I D P C RESIDENT SIGNATURE 
/ed: CDM DATE/^r -<£57TIME /S^ ^ 
APPROVED DISAPPROVED 
REMARKS: 
CDM SIGNATURE 3^* 
W LIBRARY 
FORWARDED FOR YOUR COMPLIANCE 
DATE /TIME 
ADDENDUM K 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to . . . have a speedy public trial . . . . 
2. Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right . . . to have a speedy public trial . . . . 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(f) (1953 as amended). 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district where the 
offense is alleged to have been committed; 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1953 as amended). 
See following pages. 
DISPOSITION OP DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 77-29-5 
77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons. The provi-
sions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged to be 
incompetent to proceed under chapter 15. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand. Escape from custody by 
a prisoner after delivery of the written demand referred to in section 
77-29-1(1) shall void the request. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-4, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment into law 
— Text of agreement. The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby 
enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions 
legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows: 
The contracting states solemnly agree that 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, 
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and 
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other 
jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner 
treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party 
states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and 
orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status 
of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or 
complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to 
such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, 
cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operative procedures. It is the 
further purpose of this agreement to provide such co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used in this agreement: 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States 
of America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of 
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcer-
ated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant 
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availabil-
ity is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had 
on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Arti-
cle IV hereof. 
77-29-5 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE III 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a 
penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the 
continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other 
party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis 
of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be 
brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered 
to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting 
officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and 
his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, informa-
tion or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the 
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request 
of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate 
official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment 
under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time 
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, 
the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state 
parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in 
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, 
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who 
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate 
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt 
requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having 
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and con-
tents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his 
right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information 
or complaint on which the detainer is based. 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all 
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose 
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. 
The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody 
of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers 
and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the 
prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being 
initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph 
shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, 
and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or 
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 77-29-5 
shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an 
order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
a paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition 
with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included 
therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to 
the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after 
completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request 
for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the 
production of his body in any court where his presence may be required 
in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent 
voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accord-
ance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph 
shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permit-
ted by law. 
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of 
the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall 
void the request. 
ARTICLE IV 
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried 
indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have 
a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a 
term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance 
with Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for tempo-
rary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in 
which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdic-
tion of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly 
approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided further that 
there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate authori-
ties before the request be honored, within which period the governor of 
the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or 
availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in para-
graph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in cus-
tody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already 
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of 
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any 
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authori-
ties simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts 
in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with 
similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for cus-
tody or availability and of the reasons therefor. 
77-29-5 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall 
be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the pris-
oner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the 
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any 
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his deliv-
ery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be 
opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the send-
ing state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint con-
templated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original 
place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment, 
information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and 
the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
ARTICLE V 
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, 
the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver tempo-
rary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state 
where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such 
person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the 
request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary 
custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of 
this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority 
in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided 
by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the 
place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the 
custodian. 
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of 
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand: 
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the 
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given. 
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint 
on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of 
which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made. 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary 
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been 
lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or 
Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the 
indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an 
order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon 
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(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only 
for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges con-
tained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints 
which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on 
any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except 
for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any 
place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held 
in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting pros-
ecution. 
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this 
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. 
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner 
is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, 
time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall 
be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and prac-
tice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow. 
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as 
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to 
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state 
and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same 
manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any 
other manner permitted by law. 
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pur-
suant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory 
and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more 
untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which 
trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay 
all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned 
shall have entered into a supplementary agreement' providing for a differ-
ent allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among them-
selves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any 
internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and 
in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdi-
visions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor. 
ARTICLE VI 
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time peri-
ods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said 
time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is 
unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of 
the matter. 
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by 
this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally 
ill. 
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ARTICLE VII 
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting 
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and 
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this 
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, informa-
tion necessary to the effective operation of this agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state 
when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agree-
ment may withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. How-
ever, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any 
proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time 
such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect 
thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its pur-
poses. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any 
phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be 
contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or 
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circum-
stance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and 
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circum-
stance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held con-
trary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall 
remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force 
and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters. 
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